Given the increasing number of prisoners serving life sentences in England and Wales, and the increasing average length of these sentences, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the experiences and effects of such sanctions. This article describes how prisoners serving very long sentences from an early age adapt over time to their circumstances. In particular, it focuses on the transition between the early and subsequent stages of such sentences, specifically, the ways that these prisoners adapt to the sentence, find means of managing time, come to terms with their offense, shift their conception of control and self-control, make their sentence constructive, and find wider meaning in and from their predicament. Our argument is that most prisoners demonstrate a shift from a form of agency that is reactive to one that is more productive, as they learn to 'swim with', rather than against, the tide of their situation.
should be noted that the literature on long-term female prisoners is even sparser (although see Walker and Worrall 2000, and XXXX, in progress) -Zamble (1992: 421) reports that, over time, such men deliberately withdraw 'from the diffuse social networks that are typical of inmate interactions' maintain their emotional ties with people in the community, become more positive in their attitudes towards the criminal justice system, and become progressively more preoccupied with the future. 'In effect, they sometimes seemed to be living within a world of their own, inside the prison but separate and apart from its ordinary discourse … if their bodies were in prison, their cognitive focus was elsewhere' (p421).
Here, then, the findings of qualitative and quantitative studies are consistent in suggesting that long-term prisoners find ways of coping that make the problems of imprisonment more manageable over time (even if, as XXXX argue, this may come at some cost). Much of the existing literature is, however, somewhat dated, and is based on studies in the United States, whose exceptional commitment to imposing very long sentences is not generalizable throughout the developed world. This article seeks to advance the body of research in this area, drawing on a study of life sentenced prisoners in England and Wales not just to offer insight into the experience of long-term confinement, but to expose the terms and dynamics of personal change, as these men and women adapt to life-changing periods of time behind bars. We begin by focussing on prisoners' general descriptions of adapting to their sentence, which involved recognising the basic need to cope with and 'make the most of' their situation, acknowledging that the prison was now the primary life domain, and reframing and rationalizing the predicament in a positive manner. Based on participants' recollections of their sentences or on differences between the accounts of prisoners at different sentence stages, we go on to detail transitions in four key domains: the perception and management of time, consideration of the offense, the conception of control and self-control, and practices of making meaning and finding purpose. In doing so, and drawing on work by Margaret Archer on different modes of reflexivity, we highlight clear differences between the orientations of prisoners at the early and subsequent stages of very long sentences, emphasizing a shift from a form of agency that was essentially backwards-looking and reactive to one which was future-oriented and productive, albeit within the particular parameters of prolonged confinement. While those in the initial years of their sentences felt able to determine their lives in limited ways, within limited spheres, and with limited existential return -in part because they were often exercising agency against the flow of their carceral predicamentthose who had served longer periods felt more able to shape their lives, within a greater number of domains, and in ways that provided them with greater meaning and fulfilment.
The Study
The research on which this article is based focused on men and women serving very long life sentences (a minimum/'tariff' period of 15 years or more), sentenced when aged 25 years or younger.
2 This focus was born out of a concern with the increasing number of prisoners serving very long sentences, in England and Wales particularly, and the absence of research on experiences and consequences of such disposals, both for the offenders themselves and for those who manage them. Data provided by the National Offender Management Service revealed that, at the start of the fieldwork period (in February 2013), there were 789 male prisoners and 29 female in the England and Wales prison system who met these criteria.
Our fieldwork involved two main methods. The first involved the distribution of a survey, primarily designed to assess the problems of long-term imprisonment, to all prisoners who met our criteria in all of the 24 prisons (15 holding male prisoners and nine holding female prisoners) in which we collected data. 3 The second involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 125 men and 21 women within these establishments. Male participants were selected based on a purposive sampling procedure designed to capture prisoners at different sentence stages, in order to explore the ways in which the challenges and experience of longterm confinement might vary according to the phase of the sentence. These sentence stages were determined as follows: Early -less than four years served (at the point at which the study began); Mid -the mid-point of an individual's tariff, plus or minus two years; Latetariff end date minus two years onwards.
4 Specifically, having received official data from the National Offender Management Service about the location of prisoners who met our criteria,
we sampled prisoners at different sentence stages and in different kinds of establishments (i.e. different security-levels) in ways that reflected both the number of prisoners at these stages and in these types of establishment within the overall population. 5 Interviews were therefore undertaken in a broad range of prisons in which life-sentenced prisoners are accommodated (normally among prisoners serving a range of sentences), including young offender institutions, high-security prisons, and category B, C and D establishments (high/mediumsecurity, medium-security, and open prisons), covering the entire spectrum of prison types within the England and Wales prison system. Due to the relatively low number of women serving very long life sentences from young adulthood at the time of our fieldwork, we sought to interview all those who met our research criteria, regardless of sentence stage. In total, 310 men (39% of the male population who matched the research criteria) and 23 adaptive styles and strategies during the subsequent periods of the sentence. 7 Much of the material that features in this article derives not just from the responses to these questions, but from general discussion of the experience of the sentence over many years. All interviews were transcribed and coded in full, using an iterative analytic approach, which organized the material using a pre-defined thematic framework while leaving room for the addition and deletion of themes where appropriate. Prisoners' adaptive patterns were relevant to each of these areas, and represent an overarching theme within the research. Those that we identify in this article represent general rather than universal patterns.
Adapting to the Sentence
'A long prison sentence is not […] a short intermission in the real business of life, it is the real business of life … one has to either face the fact that one's life was over at the moment of entering the prison, or that one's life is that existence which takes place within the prison' (Cohen and Taylor 1972: 90-1) For the majority of participants, the early phase of the sentence was characterized by bewilderment, anger, denial, and a form of 'temporal vertigo' resulting from consideration of the sheer amount of time in prison that lay ahead (see XXXX, in press). Many prisoners who were further into their sentences continued to harbor underlying feelings of desperation and resentment about their predicament. However, the common view was that, following an initial period of turmoil, accepting the situation was essential for psychological survival, and 'coping' was unexpectedly achievable:
Maybe it's just me, but there's nothing I can do, I've learnt to accept the sentence.
[…] you just have to still get on with life. As suggested here, then, coming to terms with the sentence was precipitated by the realization that the outside world was moving on in one's absence. It also meant ; 'There's a lot of people in worse situations around the world so...'). The strained optimism of these rationalizations signalled the need for prisoners to try to develop a positive narrative of their current situation, and -as the external world became more distant -to deal productively with the issues that they faced: the time that lay ahead of them, their crimes, and issues of control, personal development and existential meaning. In the following sections, then, we turn to each of these domains in more detail, highlighting throughout an underlying shift from a form of agency that was largely regressive and reactive to one that was progressive and productive.
Managing time
O'Donnell (2014: 177) notes that: 'Despite its centrality to their lived experience, little is known about how prisoners negotiate time'. Almost all prisoners in our study who were in the early years of their sentence expressed difficulties in managing the perpetual present of their sentence, and making sense of the amount of time that they were facing in prison. When asked specifically how they thought about and handled 'time', they talked of the impossibility of getting to grips with sentences that were often as long as the number of years they had been alive, or of the psychological risks of dwelling on what lay ahead:
How do you think about your time in here?
I don't; I just don't think about it.
Do you think about day-to-day, week-to-week?
No.
Do you plan at all?
Do you plan your days at all, plan your weeks at all?
No. I take days as they come and I don't want to do none of that. Certain phrases -'I just take each day as it comes'; 'you take it a day at a time' -were strikingly recurrent (see Zamble 1992) . Such responses spoke of a lack of capacity to conceptualize their own future, and of deep despondency: 'Tomorrow is irrelevant.
Tomorrow's gonna be similar to today, so there's no point thinking about tomorrow'; 'Today's the day. If you survive it, that's another day tomorrow'.
Significantly, early-stage prisoners described the present as well as the future as endless and without hope: 'life just stops when you are behind these doors. Like it's frozen the time, basically'. Imprisonment was described as 'just existing … You're not really living, are you?'
They considered themselves 'stuck in time' -what Zamble and Porporino (1988) describe as a form of 'deep freeze ' and Cope (2003: 165) reports as a form of 'suspension'. When they described how they managed time, generally they talked through a daily timetable, or mundane short-term milestones, such as the programming of television shows. Typically, these activities were described as means of 'killing time', that is, consuming an unwanted and surplus entity. The metaphor of death was also discernible in descriptions of the nature of time in this early sentence phase:
It was just killing dead time I suppose, the first [few years]... it was just dead time.
You're not progressing, you're not going backwards -you're sort of stuck in limbo.
You're treading water. (Gibson, 30s, 20-yr tariff, served 10)
Terms such as 'stuck in limbo' and 'treading water' were telling. Neither connote sheer passivity as such, since they require contortion and effort. But the former indicates being stuck between two states, while the latter implies expending energy to try to counter both the flow of the current and its direction of travel, in a manner that is ultimately unsustainable.
Among participants who were further into their sentences, responses were considerably more having only 'single figures' remaining were major psychological milestones ('the home stretch'). Although these prisoners often could not think through the entirety of the span of time ahead of them, compared to their early-stage counterparts, they were much more able to cast themselves beyond the immediate present. Even in describing calendar years, they more often talked of the rhythm of specific sport seasons (e.g. motor racing, football), or patterns that they themselves imposed upon the months:
Gymnasium has been the most constructive thing for me because I started to train seasonally, so in winter I would bulk up, in summer I would cut up. And I started to think in seasons and just throw everything into gym, so I'd surround meself with guys that go to the gym. We'd converse. In explaining how they passed their days -for example, through reading and study, computer games and television, and the gym -their accounts were not suffused with the sense that they More significantly, as suggested here, mid-stage prisoners were much more likely than earlystage prisoners to describe time as something that could be used constructively, rather than just filled and expended (Flanagan 1981 time became less of a burden to be fought or managed, and more a resource to be harnessed.
Coming to terms with the offense
For a large proportion of participants, an essential component of adapting to their reality involved coming to terms with their offense. Prisoners who were some way into their sentences often recalled that, in their first few years of imprisonment, they had sought to deny the full implications of their crime (by engaging in various forms of offense minimization, or by 'burying' it through the use of drugs and alcohol). Many explained that they had initially felt a form of inchoate anger, reflecting a set of un-processed sentiments about what they had done and its consequences. Dealing with, and moving on from, these feelings required a broader process of 'accepting' and 'taking responsibility' for the offense:
feelings of guilt, while finding means of self-forgiveness, they could avoid being
psychologically swamped by what they had done.
Coming to terms with being a murderer also involved the management of shame. Most interviewees who were not disputing their guilt were highly remorseful about what they had done, and expressed disgust and bewilderment that they had been capable of this crime (see Again, then, 'learning to live with' the offense meant no longer just 'reacting' to it, as an act in the past, through forms of anger and denial, but using it positively to turn to the future.
Many interviewees described engaging in forms of self-management so as to avoid the kinds of behaviors and reactions that had led to their index offense:
It's sad that somebody had to lose their life for this to happen. But I've learnt from that
[…] I mean, it was a terrible mistake. But I've never struck anybody and I deal with anger not physically, I'll walk away, I'll take time out, I will calm myself [and] Here, prisoners were engaging in the kind of reflection and ethical self-cultivation that Foucault (1986) describes as a form of moral 'subjectivation'. As well as seeking to understand what had led to their imprisonment, they were developing their own 'code' for living, and, in doing so, re-constituting themselves as ethical agents, able to choose key aspects of personal conduct and invest these choices with moral meaning.
As part of the process of overcoming feelings of shame, interviewees who were beyond the first few years of the sentence also talked consistently about wanting to give something back to the 'younger generation' (Erikson's (1982) 'generativity'). The language of redemption and 'making amends' was recurrent (Irwin 2009 ). These sentiments were rooted in a sense that, in effect, two lives had been 'wasted', those of both the victim and the perpetrator:
All I can do is I can take the positives from this situation. A person of 19 years old died, you know, and I can never ever take that back. As indicated in these quotations, early-stage prisoners were preoccupied with the basic terms of their predicament, and interpreted 'control' in relation to the structural limits on their freedom(s). Accordingly, the absence of control was felt most keenly in relation to the general loss of liberty, and the power held over them by prison officers. Ultimately, then, these prisoners felt that their lives were primarily determined by other individuals.
The responses of participants who were further into their sentences shared many characteristics with these narratives, but exhibited a much stronger sense that key aspects of life could be self-determined. Mid-and late-stage prisoners certainly recognized that their control was in many ways circumscribed. However, they were better able to identify the specific areas of life over which they did and did not have control, and had a more expansive conception of the former:
Do you feel that you've got control of your life in here?
Not really, of course I haven't. Someone tells me when to bang up, when to shit, when to eat, so obviously I haven't, but I try and keep as much control of my life that I can.
[ 
You have said 'It is what it is' quite a few times, and it seems to be quite an important mantra for you […].
Yes because I know how much time and energy I would waste on doing that, when I first come away, about things I couldn't change, and I would never be able to change.
[…] You are wasting that time, when you could be using that time on something else that you could change […] . And that's what I've tried to do ever since, is not go over old ground that you can't work out any different to what it is. Some things are what
In contrast, prisoners who were beyond the early sentence phase had generally come to terms with the relocation of 'life' -at least in some senses -from the external community to the prison interior. As suggested above, for some, this meant trying to lead a life that was analogous to the one they might have led outside, by investing in education or learning new skills (see Cohen and Taylor 1972; Zamble 1992) . For others, spurred by a sense of having hit 'rock bottom', it involved a more comprehensive project of change. 10 Certainly, most interviewees -once they had come to terms with their conviction and sentence lengthwanted to 'achieve something better in my life' and make the most of their sentence, through the kinds of redemptive projects discussed above or other forms of self-improvement:
My plan is do as much education as humanly possible. Just not to waste any time while I'm in jail, basically. That's the goal. I'm here so I might as well use that time the best I can, so if I focus on education that's something that will stay with me when I finally get out and will benefit me. (Antone, 20s, 17-yr tariff, served 3)
Many interviewees expressed a commitment to a more wholesale form of personal change, describing the sentence as 'a chance to work on myself', 'see the bigger picture', and 'make myself a better person'. Since they were relatively young when sentenced, they felt a sense of loss not -as is often described (e.g. Crawley and Sparks 2006; Jewkes 2005 ) -for the life that they had already established, but the life that they had expected to lead, their possible selves and achievements. With few resources of identity and status from before their sentence to draw on, their orientation was to the future rather than the past. Instead of seeking to cling onto a 'respectable self' that was already established, they sought to create such a person anew. In doing so, they often invoked notions of self-discovery or reconstruction -a sense 10 It was striking that, when asked how they 'built a life' in prison, most interviewees responded by talking about the construction of a new personal identity, rather than a set of social relations. that they were unearthing or developing a deeper understanding of themselves and the behavior that had led to their imprisonment ('I feel I know who I am, finally').
Those prisoners who were committed to faith practices (in particular It made the verdict a lot easier to take in a sense that: 'God, you promised that you'd never leave me, and never abandon me, so just help me through this' […] I believe that God never gives you more than you can bear. So [I] know that I'll be able to cope, I know that I'll be able to get through it.
[…] I would find it hard to go through this sentence without believing in a higher purpose, without believing that there's a reason for me going through this and experiencing this. Finally, faith ideologies offered a hook for moral transformation and identity change. As explained mainly by interviewees who were further into their sentences, it showed them how to be other-oriented ('you actually have compassion and awareness of the world and people around you') and guided those who felt adrift from their humanity 'how to be a normal decent human being'.
Concluding Comments
In Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation, Margaret Archer (2003) emotionally on their condition rather than act purposefully in pursuit of a goal. While some reflect nostalgically on a past that no longer provides a guide to action -either because of discontinuity of social circumstances, or because of some kind of profound personal change, such as serious illness or marital breakdown -others 'grasp in desperation at unrealistic projects' (p303). Whichever the case, lacking the kind of 'strict personal identity' which enables the formation of personal projects, they are 'passive agents', whose subjectivity makes no difference to the play of objective circumstances upon them' (p299).
A striking attribute of fractured reflexives, and a reflection of their agential passivity, is their tendency to 'take each day as it comes' (p314) or 'just go with life' (p330). Similarly, in the 2012 elaboration of her argument, she describes the 'expressive reflexive' (a sub-type of the fractured reflexive) as exercising agency 'solely in relation to the present moment and current circumstances, rather than assuming any reflexive governance over the shape of their lives' (Archer 2012: 250) . Swamped by his or her problems, the expressive reflexive lives life in a constant, episodic 'present', with decisions based on 'gut feelings' rather than an interior dialogue directed towards the future.
Here, then, Archer's account is striking in its resonance with our analysis of early-stage longterm prisoners. As we have explained, such prisoners were defined primarily by the shock of being in a situation that was both unexpected and extreme. This situation had two main components: first, a profound incongruity between the prisoner's self-conception and the unexpected reality that he or she now encountered; second, the psychic burden of having been involved in a murder, with its accompanying shame, and/or the trauma of confronting a life-bending prison sentence. While contextual dislocation left these prisoners without a set of tacit guidelines for knowing how to 'go on', the sheer difficulty of confronting both their offence and their penal predicament inhibited them from engaging in forms of internal deliberation and future-oriented life-building. It also meant that their agency was not simply passive, but also reactive. Energy was committed to managing immediate forms of emotion (such as anger, shock and trauma), as well as seeking to deny aspects of their situation that they could not realistically influence (i.e. their basic state of being incarcerated). At the same time, they felt themselves to have little control over their daily existence and longer-term futures within the prison. In this respect, despite their emotional agitation, they were largely passive in the context of their everyday condition:
The first two years … I just didn't know whether I was coming or going, you know. It However, these patterns of thought and action were not static. Participants who were further into their sentences had generally come to accept their predicament, worked out which areas of their lives they could and could not control, and begun to find purpose and meaning in their lives. Their focus was less on the past than the future, and their use of the present was constructive rather than merely depletive. Despite -and in some ways because of -their overarching stoicism with regard to their general circumstances, in their daily practices, they exhibited a form of productive agency, in which they sought to make the most of a situation that was not of their choosing, but from which they believed they could derive some personal value. Within the prison's structural cocoon, then, they were agentically active.
At this stage, then, the prisoner resembles Archer's 'meta-reflexive', divorced from the behavioural repertoire set out by their past, and seeking a new modus vivendi, driven by some kind of cause, vocation or ideal. Just as our later-stage participants were preoccupied with existential introspection, Archer describes meta-reflexives as highly self-monitoring, engaged in an ongoing internal conversation about the self. For our participants, it was the profound rupture of the sentence that eventually generated this search for self-understanding and meaning, along with a profound alienation from the self resulting from involvement in an act of murder. It is significant that this quest was often resolved through spiritual or religious practices, or a focus on personal ethics, for these are among the few cultural resources that are available in the context of imprisonment. As Archer notes, 'certain intentional human activities, like private prayer, can never be the objects of structural and cultural constraints ' (2003: 8) . The relevance of her framework is thus made apparent: long-term imprisonment, involves a decisive dislocation of agent from context, and brings into particularly sharp relief the dynamics of reflexivity, action and constraint.
For our purposes, the most helpful metaphor is tidal. Prisoners in earlier sentence stages were in effect treading water, being carried by the tide of the sentence or were seeking to swim against it. Those further on had come to accept that they could not escape the water, or the direction of its flow. They were swimming with the tide, rather than against it, using its energy to their advantage. In this regard, our findings are consistent with O'Donnell's concept of 'acceptance', as distinct from capitulation: 'yielding to rather than opposing the acceptance', and we would call the 'adaptive imperative'). To psychologically survive the sentence, let alone glean something from it, necessitated that sentiments of bitterness and desperation were set aside.
While the adaptive patterns that we have described did not hold across all participants, they applied very consistently, virtually regardless of other variables. It seems highly plausible that the nature of both the offense of murder and the exceptionally long sentences that result have a more powerful determining influence than would be found among other prisoner groups. Imported distinctions -apart from those relating to gender, and, in particular, the relevance of trauma and abuse to the lives of our female interviewees (see XXXX) -appear to be more or less flattened by the sheer heft of the act and the severity of the sanction that follows. Our findings therefore call into question the tendency within prison sociology to consider offense type somewhat irrelevant to prisoner adaptation -matters of law or psychology, rather than key determinants of the prison experience.
Our study is not without methodological limitations. Not least, it is a cross-sectional rather than longitudinal research design. 11 While much of the data on which the article builds comes from recollections of those further into their sentence about earlier periods, such reflections are no substitute for a more dynamic analysis. We cannot rule out the possibility that the nature of long-term imprisonment, and of those sentenced to the terms in which we are interested, have changed in ways that might threaten our conclusions, although the consistencies between the accounts of participants at different sentence stages gives us confidence that this is not the case. As we also note above, the fact that prisoners who are deemed to be suffering acute mental health problems are transferred to secure psychiatric hospitals means that our exclusively prison-based sample will exclude those who cope least well with their sentences. The implication of this is that our article provides an account only of how those prisoners who do, in fact, cope manage to do so, rather than an account of how all prisoners who are given such sentences respond to their predicament.
It is beyond the scope of the study to make firm statements about the post-release effects of the adaptive patterns we have identified (although see Liem and Kunst 2013; Grounds 2005) .
Notably, though, Archer comments that 'since meta-reflexives can rarely be eremitic, though the most important part of themselves may be vested in activities such as lone writing or solitary prayer, their ideal of a holistically integrated life […] condemns them to life-long frustration as social utopians ' (2003: 353) . The existence of the long-term prisoner can get close to that of the religious recluse, and, while within the prison, a 'holistically integrated
